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THE NEW UNITED NATIONS “GENDER ARCHITECTURE”: 
The creation of UN Women 
 
Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin  
 
 
The notion of institutional coherence has dominated the agenda for reform of the 
United Nations (UN) in this century. Motivated by what he saw as the weakness of the 
fractured UN system, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan led an ambitious reform 
program throughout his term of office (1996-2005) seeking to ensure greater UN 
effectiveness through streamlining institutional functions. This concern has been 
inherited by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. A significant development in the reform 
process has been the creation in 2010 of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women, known as UN Women, which came into operation on 1 
January 2011. UN Women incorporates four existing parts of the UN system dealing 
with women and has been styled as the new UN “gender architecture”.1 In this article we 
consider the implications of this new structure for the situation of women worldwide from 
the perspective of international law. Is UN Women simply a bureaucratic rearrangement 
or is it greater than the sum of its parts? 
We first describe the context of UN reform in which the objective of coherence 
plays a central role. We discuss the creation of UN Women from this perspective and 
sketch the histories of the agencies that it amalgamates. The establishment of UN 
Women unifies the patchwork of international structures dealing with women and offers 
the opportunity for greater institutional visibility of women’s lives. We then describe the 
normative architecture relating to women in international law and institutions, noting its 
fragmented, contested and contradictory quality. We argue that the creation of UN 
Women prioritised institutional coherence without adequate attention to the legal basis 
of women’s struggles for equality. It may have been assumed that the substantive 
framework is uncontroversial and settled or, alternatively, that any attempt at 
renegotiation could lead to a backlash and dilution of existing standards. In any event 
the goals of coherence, effectiveness and economic efficiency – the drivers of 
institutional reform – were detached from legal reform and norm development. We 
suggest that, without a strong normative direction, UN Women will do little to change the 
global status quo in which women’s inequality is a significant feature. We acknowledge 
that international institutions operate in a deeply politicised environment and are 
constrained in what they can achieve. Institutional reform can however encourage the 
development of international law2 and the creation of the architecture of UN Women 
may allow the elaboration of, and advocacy for, a richer concept of equality to support 
women all over the world. This would give UN Women a view -- a normative direction 
and a capacity to challenge the boundaries of international law.  
The creation of UN Women highlights what Olympe de Gouges identified in the 
eighteenth century as a critical issue for feminism: whether women’s rights are best 
protected through general norms and institutions or through specific norms and bodies 
                                                
1 A. Rao, “Gender Equality Architecture and UN Reforms: For submission to the UN Secretary-General’s 
High Level Panel on System-wide Coherence by the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership and the 
Women’s Environment and Development Organisation”, in: H. Pietilä, NGLS Development Dossier: The 
Unfinished Story of Women and the United Nations, 2007, 133 et seq. 
2 Compare C. W. Jenks, “Co-ordination in International Organization: An Introductory Survey”, BYIL 28 
(1951), 29 et seq. (32) with A. Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, 2011. 
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focussing only on women.3 The attempt to improve women’s lives through apparently 
general mechanisms can allow women’s concerns to be submerged in what are deemed 
more global issues; however, creating separate mechanisms for women can generate a 
women’s ghetto with less power, resources, and priority. Moreover, international 
institutions tend to tame feminist ideas in translating them into institutional agendas. The 
transformative power of these concepts requires support and engagement from 
communities outside the institutions. It is not yet clear whether the creation of UN 
Women will allow more or less interaction with feminist communities supporting 
substantive accounts of women’s equality. 
 
I. INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE  AS THE DRIVER OF UN REFORM 
 
  Although the need for reform of the UN has been raised from its inception,4 formal 
amendment of the Charter5 has been minimal6 and successive restructuring campaigns 
have fizzled. There is a perpetual tension between those seeking to shore up the UN as 
a chamber for global governance and those keen to limit the UN’s mandate to constrain 
national sovereignty.7 Failure to achieve concrete results leads to repetitious cycles of 
reform and renewal, exacerbated by poor institutional memory and dispersed 
information.8 Apparent reform initiatives can be deployed to preserve the status quo.9 
The reform cycle that produced UN Women appears to use the idea of coherence as a 
way of creating new structures with little consideration of their normative agenda, 
apparently assuming them to be fixed. Coherence becomes then a method of design 
that obscures the politics of the structures it creates, squeezing out the possibility of 
substantive change. 
In 1997, the first year of his tenure, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched a 
reform process that was to continue throughout his two terms and beyond. He described 
this as “the most extensive and far-reaching reforms in the fifty-two year history” of the 
UN.10 Annan’s 1997 Report on “Renewing the United Nations” identified institutional 
weakness in the fragmentation and rigidity of some of its organisational structures.11 He 
                                                
3 S. Kouvo, Making Just Rights? Mainstreaming Women’s Human Rights and a Gender Perspective, 
2004, 104.  
4 In October 1947, a study of the US Senate Expenditures Committee found the UN had “serious 
problems of overlap, duplication of effort, weak coordination, proliferating mandates and programs.” E. 
Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress, 2003, 1; See also, E. Luck, 
“Principal Organs”, in: T. Weiss & S. Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 2007, 653 
et seq. 
5 UN Charter, Arts. 108-109.  
6 The UN Charter has been amended three times.  See, Question of equitable representation on the 
Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, A/RES/1991(XVII) A-B of 17 December 1963.  
Part A of the resolution decided, in accordance with Article 108 of the UN Charter, to expand Security 
Council membership from 11 to 15 members; Part B decided to expand the membership of ECOSOC from 
18 to 27.  In 1971, the General Assembly again decided to enlarge the membership of ECOSOC, this time 
to 54 members: Enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, A/RES/2847(XXVI) of 20 December 
1971. 
7 See P. Alston, “The United Nations: No Hope for Reform?”, in: A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The 
Future of International Law, 2012, 38 et seq. 
8 Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, Some Measures to Improve Overall Performance of the United 
Nations System at the Country Level – Part I: A Short History of United Nations Reform in Development, 
Doc. JIU/Rep/2005/2 Pt I, 2005 (Doris Bertrand), para. 28; See also, D. Kennedy, “A New World Order: 
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”, Transnat’l. & Contemp. Probs. 4 (1994), 329 et seq. 
9 D. Kennedy, “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box”, N.Y.U. J. Intl’l L. & Pol. 32 (1999-
2000), 335 et seq. (465).  
10 UN Secretary-General, “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform”, Letter of Transmittal 
to the President of the UN General Assembly, Doc A/51/950 of 14 July 1997. 
11 Ibid., para. 12. 
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envisaged “an extensive and far-reaching set of changes [to] move the Organisation 
firmly along the road to major and fundamental reform.”12 Annan commissioned a suite 
of high level panels to report to him on different aspects of reform, from internal 
management, peace operations, relations with civil society, to development. After 
consideration of the recommendations made by the panels, the Secretary-General had 
to take his proposals to the UN General Assembly, thereby shifting from an expert to a 
political process. This sectoral approach to reform was further politicised when it was 
overtaken by a number of scandals involving UN personnel,13 as well as by the deep 
divisions between member states caused by the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
At the Millennium Summit in 2000 the General Assembly asserted its 
determination to “spare no effort” in making the Organisation “a more effective 
instrument” for the pursuit of the priorities it had enunciated, including by strengthening 
its organs and “adopting the best management practices”.14 In response to what he 
termed a “decisive moment” for the UN, Annan established a High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, which reported in 2004.15 The High Level Panel made 
101 policy and institutional recommendations to make the UN more “effective, efficient 
and equitable.”16 It emphasised the need for institutions to work better, for greater 
effectiveness and credibility, proposed changes to existing UN organs, including the 
General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), the abolition of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the 
establishment of two new institutions, the Human Rights Council (to replace the CHR) 
and the Peacebuilding Commission. Kofi Annan’s response to the High Level Panel’s 
report called for its “integrated and co-ordinated” implementation.17 He recalled the 
reform processes that he had set in train since 1997 and the measures he had 
introduced relating to coordination in the development and humanitarian fields and the 
work of the UN at the country level. Despite some progress, the Secretary-General 
observed that “the United Nations system as a whole is still not delivering services in the 
coherent, effective way that the world’s citizens need and deserve.”18  
At its 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly resolved to strengthen the 
UN through “enhancing its authority and efficiency”19 and reiterated its support for 
“system-wide coherence.”20 However, as has consistently been the case in UN reform 
projects, political divisions curtailed the General Assembly’s adoption of the proposed 
reforms, in particular omitting any reform of the composition or competence of the 
Security Council. Indeed it has been suggested that Annan’s reform initiative was poorly 
conceived and doomed to failure because of his misjudgement that the UN’s problems 
could be resolved through institutional change.21 In any event, seeking widespread 
reform through member state negotiation is a fraught process that opens up 
disagreement and risks backlash. The 2005 World Summit did tentatively endorse some 
                                                
12 Ibid., para 6.  
13 E.g., P. A. Volcker/ R. J. Goldstone/ M. Pieth, Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations 
Oil-for-Food Program, Manipulation of the oil-for-food Program by the Iraqi Regime, 2005.   
14 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/RES/55/2 of 18 September 2000.  
15 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Doc A/59/565 of 2 December 2004. 
16 See also Letter of Transmittal dated 1 December 2004 from the Chair of the High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change addressed to the Secretary-General. 
17 UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All, 
Doc. A/59/2005 of 21 March 2005.  
18 Ibid., para. 196.  
19 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 of 16 September 2005.  
20 Ibid., para. 169.  
21 E. Luck, “How Not to Reform the United Nations”, Global Governance 11 (2005), 407 et seq. (409). 
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normative principles such as the “responsibility to protect.”22 Its abolition of the CHR 
rested on concerns of lack of credibility and politicisation as well as ineffectiveness. 
Overall, however, the language of Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s UN reform project 
had a managerial cast: reform is regarded as important to create coherence, 
accountability and transparency, ensuring smooth and cost-effective functioning and 
delivery of support at the national level. It is surprising, then, that his agenda for UN 
reform took some time to get to the tangle of UN bodies relating to women, given their 
institutional incoherence through their ad hoc development and overlapping mandates. 
 
II. THE UN’S WOMEN’S ARCHITECTURE 
 
Women have been formally on the UN’s agenda since its inception in 1945. The 
UN Charter “reaffirm[ed] faith … in the equal rights of men and women”23 and declared 
that one of its purposes was promotion and encouragement of “respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to … sex.”24 Article 8 of the 
Charter stipulated that the UN should “place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and 
women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and 
subsidiary organs.” These provisions were the result of energetic diplomacy by women 
delegates to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and sustained lobbying by women’s 
non-government organisations (NGOs).25  
Women’s participation in the UN was the initial focus. The issue of women being 
included in national delegations to the UN was raised at the first session of the UN 
General Assembly held in London in 1946. France proposed a declaration to encourage 
UN delegations to increase their “feminine participation,” in large measure as a form of 
recognition of women’s roles during the Second World War. Various countries spoke in 
support of the French proposal, although it was not adopted formally.26 The General 
Assembly did however adopt a resolution on the political rights of women, 
recommending that Member States grant women the same political rights as men.27 At 
the same session of the General Assembly, Eleanor Roosevelt, a member of the United 
States’ delegation, read out an “Open letter to the women of the world” prepared by the 
seventeen women who were either members of or advisers to eleven of the fifty-one UN 
member delegations. The letter noted the many tasks women had “performed so notably 
and valiantly during the war” and called upon governments “to encourage women 
everywhere to take a more active part in national and international affairs, and on 
women … to come forward and share in the work of peace and reconstruction.”28   
                                                
22 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 22, paras. 138-40; the language was repeated in S/RES/1973, 
para. 4 of 17 March 2011: “[T]o protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack”. 
23 UN Charter, preamble. 
24 UN Charter, Art. 1, para. 3. This was the first assertion in an international treaty of the prohibition of 
distinction on the basis of sex.  
25 M. Galey, “Forerunners in Women’s Quest for Partnership”, in: Anne Winslow (ed.), Women, Politics 
and the United Nations, 1995, 1 et seq. (6-8); A. S. Fraser, “Becoming Human: The Origins and 
Development of Women's Human Rights”, HRQ 21, 1999, 853 et seq. (886).  
26 UN League of Nations Committee, Declaration on the Participation of Women in the Work of the United 
Nations: Report of the General Committee, Doc. A/PV.29 of 12 February 1946. 
27 Political Rights of Women, A/RES/56(I) of 11 December 1946. 
28 The open letter was drafted in meetings arranged by Eleanor Roosevelt over tea in her room at the 
Claridges Hotel.  See, M. A. Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 2001, 29.  The letter acknowledges that not all women may agree that 
participation in public life is their most immediate concern, as some were not yet able to claim full 
citizenship in their home countries.  Nevertheless, delegates and advisers set out four tasks for women: 
active participation to improve living standards in their own countries “so that there will be qualified women 
ready to accept responsibility when new opportunities arise”; raising their children “boys and girls alike, to 
understand world problems and the need for international cooperation, as well as the problems of their 
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Although women’s lives remain disadvantaged compared to men’s on most global 
indicators,29 attention to women has wavered within the UN since this flurry of early 
activity. The major response to claims for international recognition of women’s lives has 
been the creation of specialised institutions, through which there has been a steady, but 
fragmented, body of work, involving the negotiation of women-specific treaties, research 
into the condition of women, collection of data and statistics, and policy development.30 
The following sections outline the mandates of the specialised institutions responsible 
for this work.   
 
1. The Commission on the Status of Women 
 
The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was the first global 
institution assigned a mandate to make recommendations “on urgent problems requiring 
immediate attention in the field of women’s rights.”31 It is a political body now comprising 
45 UN member states. Although there were precedents in the Committee of Experts on 
the Legal Status of Women established by the League of Nations in 1937 (consisting of 
three men and four women)32 and the Inter-American Commission on Women in 1928, 
the creation of CSW was the result of a battle within the UN General Assembly.33 Brazil 
proposed a separate women’s commission at the first General Assembly session, 
distinct from the CHR, which had been established in 1946.34 The proposal was 
supported by many of the women delegates but roundly opposed by the US delegate, 
Virginia Gildersleeve. Gildersleeve argued that a separate women’s commission would 
be discriminatory and unnecessary in that women’s questions could be adequately dealt 
with by the CHR.35 
This dispute was resolved through compromise between the two positions: the 
formation by ECOSOC of a sub-commission of the CHR devoted to women. However, at 
the urging of Bodil Begtrup, a Danish delegate and the first Chair of the Sub-commission 
on the Status of Women, ECOSOC adopted a resolution for the formation of a separate, 
free-standing functional commission on women in 1946.36 This gave CSW formal status 
within the UN system. As a sub-commission it had been empowered to “submit 
proposals, recommendations and reports to the CHR regarding the status of women” 
and through the Commission to ECOSOC.37 As an independent commission its reports 
and recommendations went directly to ECOSOC, thereby enabling it to determine its 
own timetable and agenda. CSW engaged with the work of the CHR, notably in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
own countries”; not to allow themselves “to be misled by anti-democratic movements now or in the future”; 
and to accept that “the goal of full participation in the life and responsibilities of their countries and of the 
world community is a common objective toward which the women of the world should assist one another.”  
29 UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2010, 2010, 89, <http://hdr.undp.org/>. 
30 “The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1995”, The United Nations Blue Book 
Series, Vol. VI, 1995, contains much of this work.   
31 Resolution establishing the Commission on the Status of Women, E/RES/2/11 of 21 June 1946. 
32 Pietilä, see note 2, 6; F. De Haan, “Women’s Rights: A Brief Survey from 1945 to 2009”, UN Chronicle 
XLVII (1) (2010), 56 et seq. 
33 Pietilä, see note 2, 15.  
34 Bertha Lutz, a member of the Brazilian delegation, had been a leading figure in the suffrage movement 
in Brazil and a delegate at the Pan-American Women’s conference in Baltimore in 1922: See, J. Hahner, 
Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women’s Rights in Brazil, 1990.  
35 Fraser, see note 26, 886.  Gildersleeve was supported by Eleanor Roosevelt on this point:  See, D. 
Jain, Women, Development and the United Nations, 2005, 17-18. 
36 E/RES/2/11, see note 32. 
37 E/RES/5(I) of 16 February 1946, paras. 2-3. 
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drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.38 CSW members were 
government delegates, but one observer noted that they appeared more personally 
engaged with the institution’s goals than members of other UN bodies and that they 
acted “as a kind of lobby for the women of the world.”39 Accordingly CSW members built 
close relationships with women’s NGOs.  
In her plea to ECOSOC to establish CSW, Bodil Begtrup considered the 
argument against specialised women’s bodies on the grounds that women’s problems 
were not separate from men’s. She responded:  
 
[T]his point of view is purely unrealistic and academic. The practice shows that 
[ECOSOC] has special problems that are connected with the status of women. 
These problems have now for the first time in history to be studied internationally 
as such and to be given the social importance they ought to have. … The feeling 
that this big body [the UN], with all the social and political difficulties before it, still 
has time to take an interest in the daily life and in raising the status of women has 
aroused an enormous interest ….40 
 
CSW’s mandate was couched in the language of rights: it was to report to 
ECOSOC on “promoting women’s rights in political, economic, social and educational 
fields” as well as making recommendations on “urgent problems requiring immediate 
attention in the field of women’s rights.”41 In what has been called its first phase of 
activity, CSW focused on enhancing recognition of women’s right to equality.42 It then 
shifted its orientation towards economic and social development.43 CSW has continued 
as the major global policy-making body with respect to women, working in conjunction 
with, or as the support body for, many of the bodies and processes discussed below. It 
did not attract the criticisms of politicisation and ineffectiveness that dogged the CHR 
leading to that body’s abolition in 2006 and replacement by the Human Rights Council.44 
However, the existence of a separate women’s body created the potential for 
marginalisation of women’s concerns in the work of the CHR.45  
 Until 1975 CSW was the sole UN body expressly authorised to address women’s 
concerns. In response to pressure from CSW and women’s NGOs, in 1972 the General 
Assembly resolved to hold a world summit on women in Mexico City in 1975, focusing 
on the themes of equality, development and peace and designating 1975 International 
                                                
38 See, Status of Women, E/RES/48(IV) of 29 March 1947, para. 3: CSW to be represented at ECOSOC 
“when sections of the draft of the international bill of human rights concerning the particular rights of 
women are under discussion”.  
39 Pietilä, see note 2, 14, quoting John Humphrey, first Director of the UN Secretariat Division of Human 
Rights.  
40 ECOSOC Res. E/PV.4 of 21 June 1946, reprinted in: The United Nations Bluebook Series, The United 
Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1995, (rev. ed., vol. VI, 1996), 101-2. 
41E/RES/2/11, see note 32.  The first session of CSW requested an amendment to its terms of reference 
to include a clause that CSW activities had the object of “implementing the principle that men and women 
shall have equal rights”: Doc. E/281/Rev.1 of 25 February 1947.  This request was accepted by ECOSOC: 
ECOSOC Res. 48(IV), see note 39, A, para. 7(b): ‘the fundamental purpose of the Commission to develop 
proposals for promoting equal rights for women’. 
42 L. Reanda, “The Commission on the Status of Women”, in: Philip Alston (ed.), The United Nations and 
Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, 1992, 265 et seq. (275).  
43 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the CSW on the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Programme in Relation to the Status of Women, Doc. E/CN.6/145 of 12 May 1950. 
44 Human Rights Council, A/RES/60/251 of 3 April 2006.  The Council has welcomed cooperation with the 
CSW: see Integrating the Human Rights of Women throughout the United Nations System, HRC Res. 
6/30, Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/30 of 14 December 2007. 
45 On the early relationship between the CHR and CSW, see J.Morsink, “Women’s Rights in the Universal 
Declaration”, HRQ 13 (1991), 231 et seq.  
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Women’s Year.46 Following the Mexico Conference, the General Assembly proclaimed 
the UN Decade for Women, 1976-85.47 The Decade provided a framework and timeline 
for development of UN institutions with mandates for the advancement of women across 
these broad themes. The Decade saw two more conferences convened: Copenhagen 
(1980) and Nairobi (1985). Women participated in increasing numbers in the global 
conferences, both as government delegates and as representatives of women’s 
organisations, as observers to the inter-governmental conferences and in parallel NGO 
fora.  
 The final documents adopted at the successive conferences provided a framework 
for the “adoption of national strategies, plans and programmes” and international action 
for the achievement of the objectives of the Decade. The Nairobi Conference 
recommended that “at least one world conference [on women] be held during the period 
between 1985 and the year 2000”48 and accordingly the Fourth World Conference took 
place in Beijing in 1995. This broke all records for attendance at a UN meeting, with 
delegations from 189 governments and 17,000 delegates drawn from governments, 
NGOs, and the media with over 35,000 attendees at the parallel NGO Forum.49 These 
figures led the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to describe the Beijing 
Platform for Action50 as emerging from the most participatory and inclusive process in 
history with the final document providing “a powerful agenda for the empowerment of 
women.”51 We discuss the Platform for Action further below. 
Following the Nairobi Conference, ECOSOC expanded CSW’s mandate, giving it 
a central role in monitoring progress towards achievements of the goals of the Nairobi 
Forward-Looking Strategies,52 and set out CSW’s priority themes under the Mexico 
Conference’s categories of equality, development and peace.53 Similarly after the Beijing 
Conference, CSW, together with the General Assembly and ECOSOC, was to “play the 
primary role in the overall policy-making and follow-up, and in coordinating the 
implementation and monitoring of the Platform for Action.”54 It would also perform a 
“catalytic role in mainstreaming gender” throughout policies and programs and be the 
focal point in preparation for, and subsequent implementation of the five,55 ten56 and 
                                                
46 International Women’s Year, A/RES/3010 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972. 
47 World Conference of the International Women’s Year, A/RES/3520 (XXX) of 15 December 1975. 
48 World Conference on Women, Third World Conference on Women, Nairobi, Kenya, 15-26 July 1985, 
Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade 
for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, para. 340, Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1 (1986). 
49 C. Bunch, “Women and Gender”, in: T. Weiss/ S. Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United 
Nations, 2007, 496 et seq. (499).  
50 World Conference on Women, Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 4-15 September 
1995, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Doc. A/CONF.177/20/REV.1 (1996) [hereinafter 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action]. 
51 B. Boutros-Ghali, “Translating the Momentum of Beijing into Action”, in: United Nations Department of 
Public Information, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action with the Beijing +5 Political Declaration and 
Outcome Document, 2001, 1 et seq. (2).  
52 E/RES/1987/18 of 26 May 1987; E/RES/1987/22 of 26 May1987. 
53  E/RES/1987/24 of 26 May 1987. 
54 E/RES/1996/6 of 26 July 1996.  
55 Further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, A/RES/S-
23/3 of 10 June 2000. 
56 Ten-year Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
and the outcome of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly held during the forty-ninth 
session of the CSW, from 28 February to 11 March 2005.  UN Secretary-General, Follow-up to the 4th 
World Conference on Women and Full Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: 
Rep. of the Secretary-General, Doc. A/55/293 of 11 August 2000; See also A/RES/55/71 of 8 February 
2001.  
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fifteen57 year follow-up processes. CSW has undertaken systematic analytical work on 
the implementation of the “critical areas of concern” identified in the Beijing Platform and 
selects ‘priority’ themes for its annual sessions.58   
 CSW’s original secretariat was the Section on the Status of Women within the 
Human Rights Division of the UN Department of Social Affairs. This was poorly staffed 
and financed, although one observer noted that its resource shortage was “partly 
compensated by the motivation and enthusiasm of members of the Commission.”59 The 
Section became the Branch for the Promotion of Equality between Men and Women in 
1974 and, in 1985, the Branch for the Advancement of Women. In 1988 the Branch was 
renamed the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), which it remained until its 
incorporation into UN Women. DAW moved from Vienna to New York in 1993.  
 
2. INSTRAW, UNIFEM and OSAGI 
 
The global conferences on women at Mexico City and Beijing led to the 
establishment of further specialist institutions within the UN. The International Research 
and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) was set up by 
ECOSOC in 1976 following a resolution of the Mexico conference.60 It was based in the 
Dominican Republic and its objectives were “to stimulate and assist through research, 
training and the collection and dissemination of information - the advancement of 
women and their integration in the development process both as participants and 
beneficiaries.”61 Uniquely within the UN system it was “devoted entirely to research, 
training and information in the context of the advancement of women in development.”62 
Following the Beijing Platform for Action, the General Assembly endorsed measures for 
INSTRAW’s revitalisation. These included the designation of new working methods 
through the establishment of an electronic Gender Awareness Information and 
Networking System, for “disseminating information from all countries, conducting 
research, capacity-building and networking, taking into account the special needs of 
developing countries.”63   
The UN General Assembly established the Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade for 
Women in 1976 to assist in the implementation of the World Plan of Action adopted at 
                                                
57 Report of the Secretary-General, Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action, the outcomes of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly and its contribution 
to shaping a gender perspective towards the full realization of the Millennium Development Goals, Doc. 
E/2010/4*-E/CN.6/2010/2* of 8 February 2010.  All official documentation for the 15-year review is 
available at http://www.un.org.  
58 E.g., in 2013, the Agreed Conclusions on the Elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against 
women and girls provide inter alia a comprehensive statement of states’ obligations, obstacles to their 
achievement, the inter-relationship between violence and gender inequality, the Millennium Development 
Goals, reproductive and sexual health and poverty; The elimination and prevention of all forms of violence 
against women and girls, Doc. E/CN.6/2013/L.5 of 19 March 2013.  The adoption of agreed conclusions 
on this priority theme was especially significant after the failure in 2012 to agree to conclusions on that 
year’s priority theme, The empowerment of rural women and their role in poverty and hunger eradication, 
development and current challenges, Commission on the Status of Women, Report on the 56th session 
(14 March 2011, 27 February-9 March and 15 March 2012), Doc. E/2012/27 - E/CN.6/2012/16 of 23 
March 2012, para. 28. 
59 Pietilä, see note 2, 15. 
60 World Conference of the International Women’s Year, A/RES/3520 (XXX), see note 48, para. 9; The 
International Training and Research Unit for the Advancement of Women, Doc. E/5850 of 12 May 1976. 
The establishment of UNITAR was endorsed by A/RES/31/135 of 16 December 1976.  
61 Statute of the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of 
Women, Doc. A/39/511 of 26 September 1984, art. 2.  
62 Revitalization and strengthening of INSTRAW, A/RES/54/140 of 10 February 2000. 
63 Ibid.   
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the Mexico Conference.64 In selecting programs, the Fund was to focus on rural women, 
poor women in urban areas, “and other marginal groups of women, especially the 
disadvantaged.” The Fund had a Consultative Committee of five states selected by the 
President of the General Assembly. In 1984, in the lead up to the Nairobi Conference, 
the Fund became the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). It was 
designed to be a “catalyst to ensure appropriate involvement of women in 
mainstreaming development activities and to support innovative and experimental 
activities benefiting women in line with national and regional priorities.”65 UNIFEM 
became an operational presence in countries, a semi-autonomous agency within the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP).  
The Fourth World Conference on Women called for improvements to the 
institutional capacity of the UN to implement the Beijing Platform for Action and to 
support the advancement of women.66 It proposed the creation of a high-level post in the 
UN Secretary-General’s office to advise on gender issues.67 A Special Adviser on 
gender was located within the Secretary-General’s office in 1996 but in 1997 the new 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, moved the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender 
Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI) to the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs. The Special Adviser had the status of Assistant Secretary-General and 
thus was senior enough to co-ordinate gender policy throughout the UN system. The 
major focus of OSAGI has been the task of “gender mainstreaming,” discussed further 
below, in the UN system. It has also been the base for the Office of the Focal Point for 
Women whose major concern has been the status of women in the UN system. An Ad 
Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Women was created in 1976, after the Nairobi conference, 
involving most specialised agencies and other UN entities. It met in conjunction with the 
annual meetings of the CSW, initially with the support of the DAW and subsequently that 
of OSAGI. This entity evolved into the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender 
Equality, chaired by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of 
Women.68 
Within the UN generally, the task of primary normative development is largely 
assigned to fora controlled by member states, leaving Secretariat-run institutions with 
the role of implementation through technical assistance and capacity building. In the 
area of women, the world conferences developed programmatic agendas in soft (legally 
non-binding) form. Despite its soft law status, the Beijing Platform for Action in particular 
has acquired legitimacy through its exposition of twelve critical areas of concern, its call 
for action by states, international governmental and non-governmental organisations, 
and its framework for policy guidance.69 Since Beijing, women activists and institutions 
have been concerned to preserve the normative gains achieved there.     
 
                                                
64 Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women, A/RES/31/133 of 16 December 1976. 
65 Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, The Advancement of Women Through and in the Programmes of 
the United Nations System: What Happens after the Fourth World Conference of Women, Annex I, Doc. 
JIU/REP/95/5, 1995 (Erica-Irene A. Daes); See also, World Conference on Women, Report of the World 
Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: 
Equality, Development and Peace, see note 49, para. 336. 
66 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, see note 51, para. 306.  
67 Ibid., para. 326.  
68 Other bureaucratic developments included the establishment in 2007 by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of a Women’s Rights and Gender Unit. Other UN entities have 
instituted focal points for gender issues within their internal structures, e.g. within UN peacekeeping 
missions and a gender adviser at the Department of Peacekeeeping Operations Headquarters.  
69 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, The Impact of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action 
on the Full Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, Doc. EGM/BPFA-MDG/2009/REPORT of 
22 December 2009, para. 96.  
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3. Other UN Bodies 
 
Normative development has also been achieved through women-specific 
independent expert bodies that exist in other parts of the UN, notably the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW is the expert 
monitoring body  established pursuant to  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (the Women’s Convention), adopted in 1979, to 
oversee the implementation of the Convention.70 The creation of a monitoring committee 
was controversial because some states feared that the new body might weaken the 
authority of CSW. The membership of CEDAW (like that of the other UN human rights 
treaty bodies) comprises independent experts, not government delegates as in the 
CSW. Through its concluding comments to states’ initial and periodic reports, adoption 
of thematic General Recommendations and jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention,71 the Committee has provided an extensive interpretation of states’ 
obligations “to ensure the full development and advancement of women.”72 CEDAW 
remains the only UN body dedicated to women’s advancement that has a legal, rather 
than political, mandate to ensure compliance with the treaty obligation of non-
discrimination against women.73 Another expert mandate is the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, established by the CHR in 1994.74 In 2004, the CHR 
appointed a Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and 
children75 and in 2010 the Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative on 
Sexual Violence in Conflict.76 The UN Human Rights Council established a Working 
Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice in 2010.77  
 
4. The Status of UN Women’s Institutions 
 
This brief account of the UN’s institutional engagement with women shows that 
the creation of institutions was ad hoc, creating complex levels of responsibility as new 
institutions were layered onto existing structures. This is a similar story to other areas of 
UN activity: in a decentralised system, UN member states have proliferated institutional 
mandates and tasks while rarely being able to dismantle out-dated or ineffective ones 
for political reasons.78 This is not necessarily a weakness, as Wilfred Jenks pointed out 
long ago. He observed that “functional decentralization” was chosen as the basis for the 
                                                
70 Article 17 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 
December 1979, UNTS Vol. 1249, No. 20378. 
71 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
Doc. A/RES/54/4 of 15 October 1999.  
72 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art 3 [hereinafter 
CEDAW].  For a full account of CEDAW’s normative work see M. Freeman/ C. Chinkin/ B. Rudolf (eds), 
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: A Commentary, 
2012.  
73 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, see note 71, arts 1- 3.  
74 Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1994/45 of 4 March 1994. The Special Rapporteurs to date have been Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, Yakin Ertürk and Rashida Manjoo.  
75 Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially in Women and Children, Doc. 
E/CN.4/DEC/2004/110 of 21 April 2004.  Sigma Huda (Bangladesh) was the first holder of this mandate. 
She was replaced in 2008 by Joy Ngozi Ezeilo (Nigeria). 
76 The post was mandated by S.C. Res. 1888 of 30 September 2009 on Women, peace and security: 
S/RES/1888 (2009) of 30 September 2009. Margot Wallström resigned from the position on 31 May 2012 
and has been succeeded by Zainab Hawa Bangura from Sierra Leone.  
77 Elimination of discrimination against Women, Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/23 of 8 October 2010.  
78 Luck, see note 5, 653, 655.  
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UN architecture because it enabled the largest amount of co-operation in as many areas 
as possible and because it removed technical areas from political control.79  
The UN’s women-specific institutions suffer however from low levels of support 
and visibility. For example, an Inspector of the UN’s Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) criticised 
the low status and paltry resources of DAW in 1995, noting that “four world conferences 
on women have done nothing to move the staff resources devoted to the women's 
programme from the very bottom of this United Nations resource list.”80 Both INSTRAW 
and UNIFEM were funded from voluntary contributions. Reliance on voluntary 
contributions creates uncertainty as to whether pledges will materialise, allows for 
targeted contributions and opens the way for major donors to exert influence and 
exercise leverage.81 The establishment of OSAGI without any budgetary allocation 
meant that the new functions were attached to an existing post, placing constraints on 
the operational capacity of the position from the outset.  
One measure of institutional status is the meeting time allocated to bodies such 
as CSW. Until 1987 CSW met every two years. Following the Nairobi Conference, 
ECOSOC decided that CSW should meet annually.82 This meeting takes place for ten 
working days in late February and early March. This contrasts with the time allocated to 
the CHR which, until its termination in 2006, used to meet annually for six weeks. Its 
successor, the Human Rights Council, meets regularly throughout the year "for a total 
duration of no less than ten weeks.”83 
 
III. THE CREATION OF UN WOMEN 
 
The establishment of UN Women occurred after a lengthy debate on UN reform 
across a range of areas, sketched in Section I. It should therefore be assessed within 
that wider reform process, in particular whether it is part of the UN’s standard “tinkering 
and muddle through”84 approach to reform or whether there has been a more 
fundamental institutional shift. In 1985 the Nairobi Conference had noted the unwieldy 
quality of the UN’s women’s architecture, particularly the disadvantages of the 
fragmented institutional structure for achieving the goals of the UN Decade for Women 
and the lack of any systematic co-ordination.85 In the lead up to the 1995 Conference in 
Beijing, the UN General Assembly considered a proposal by the Secretary-General for 
the merger of INSTRAW and UNIFEM.86 The JIU assessed the existing structures, 
finding progress in implementing policies relating to women “disappointing.”87 It made a 
number of specific proposals, including a more active and pragmatic role for CSW in 
                                                
79 Jenks, see note 3, 29, 37.  
80 Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, The Advancement of Women Through and in the Programmes of 
the United Nations System: What Happens after the Fourth World Conference of Women, see note 66, 
para. 210.  
81 J. Laurenti, Financing, in: Thomas Weiss & Sam Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United 
Nations, 2007, 675 et seq., 694.  
82 E/RES.1987/21 of 26 May 1987. 
83 A/ RES/ 60/251, see note 45, para. 10. 
84 Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, Some Measures to Improve Overall Performance of the United 
Nations System at the Country Level Part I: A Short History of United Nations Reform in Development, 
see note 9.  
85 World Conference on Women, Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the 
Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, see note 49, 
para. 338.   
86 A/RES/48/111 of 20 December 1993.  
87 Report of the Joint Inspection Unit The Advancement of Women Through and in the Programmes of the 
United Nations System: What Happens after the Fourth World Conference of Women, see note 66, para. 
4. 
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evaluating women's and gender programs;88 enhanced funding and status for DAW;89 
and the establishment of a system for collaboration and interaction with NGOs for 
advancing women’s programs.90 The Beijing Conference reiterated such concerns,91 
articulating the need “to renew, reform and revitalize” parts of the UN system (especially 
DAW) to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.92  
Following the Beijing Conference in 1995, OSAGI was established but the JIU’s 
budgetary and organisational recommendations were not implemented. In 1996 the 
General Assembly again considered the politically contested proposals to merge 
INSTRAW and UNIFEM but concluded it lacked the requisite information on the legal, 
technical and administrative implications of any such merger, so took no action.93 
Repeating its earlier language,94 the General Assembly recommended that interaction 
between CSW, INSTRAW, CEDAW, DAW and UNIFEM be “reviewed and rationalized 
within the context of ongoing efforts to revitalize the Economic and Social Council in 
pursuance of a stronger, more unified programme for the advancement of women.” It 
also stated that any such action with respect to the bodies related to women “must be 
considered part of the general restructuring exercise of the United Nations”,95 linking 
reform of the UN women’s architecture with the wider project of UN reform.  
Following the review of the Beijing Platform for Action in 2000, NGOs and some 
UN personnel lobbied for reform in this area but the first stages of Kofi Annan’s 
extensive UN reform agenda made no mention of any of the UN entities concerned with 
women. The 2004 report of the High Level Panel contained only limited references to 
women: it recommended that the Security Council, UN agencies and member states 
should fully implement Security Council Resolution 1325 (discussed below);96 that there 
should be greater consultation with and involvement of important voices from civil 
society in peace processes, especially those of women;97 and it called for ratification of 
the Palermo Protocol on Trafficking.98 The Secretary-General’s response to the High 
Level Panel’s report similarly made no reference to the women-specific institutions. 
Despite calls by women’s groups, the General Assembly’s World Summit Outcome 
Document did not mention reform of women-specific UN institutions. However, the 
General Assembly affirmed that “the main horizontal policy themes, such as sustainable 
development, human rights and gender, are [to be] taken into account in decision 
making throughout the United Nations.”99 Following the language of the Secretary-
General, it also emphasised the need for “system-wide coherence” in terms of UN 
policies and activities.100 This required, for example, shoring up linkages between the 
UN’s normative commitments and its operational activities and coordinating UN 
                                                
88 Ibid., paras. 202-4.  
89 Ibid., paras. 205-13.  
90 Ibid., paras.233-240.  
91 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, see note 51, para. 309.  
92 Ibid., para. 361.  
93 The UNGA noted that it had received no opinion from CSW “owing to the lack of the documents 
requested therein.” A/RES/50/162 of 1 February 1996.  
94 A/RES/ 48/111, see note 87. 
95 A/RES/50/162, see note 94. 
96 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, see note 16, para. 238. 
97 Ibid., para. 103.  
98 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 
2000, UNTS Vol. 2237, No. 39574; Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, see note 16, para. 175. 
99 A/RES/60/1, see note 20, para. 169. 
100 Ibid., paras.168-9; UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights For All, see note 18, paras. 193-8.  
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representation on the boards of development and humanitarian agencies to support 
coherence in mandates and resource allocation.  
A further dimension of the UN reform processes was a focus on UN failures in 
respect of delivery on the ground. The UN Secretary-General received an invitation from 
“global leaders” to “strengthen the management and coordination of UN operational 
activities so that they can make an even more effective contribution to the achievement 
of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development 
Goals.”101 In response Kofi Annan set up a “High Level Panel on System-Wide 
Coherence.”102 This time – in response to considerable pressure from the international 
women’s movement - the Secretary-General specifically requested the Panel to include 
an assessment of “how gender equality could be better and more fully addressed by the 
United Nations.” Only three out of fifteen members of the Panel were women. The 
Center for Women’s Global Leadership and the Women’s Environment and 
Development Organization submitted a paper, endorsed by some 50 women’s NGOs, to 
the Panel setting out their concerns with the existing system and vision for a new UN 
“gender architecture”. They argued for a “well-resourced independent entity with 
normative, operational and oversight capacity, a universal country presence and led by 
an Under-Secretary-General.”103 
The High-Level Panel’s 2006 Report, Delivering as One, addressed development, 
humanitarian assistance and the environment in a globalising world, which it identified 
as constituting the main challenges to the UN’s operational activities and its assistance 
in achieving the Millennium Development Goals.104 The Panel also addressed “cross-
cutting issues”, including gender equality, proposing reform of the “current weak 
structures” to accord women “a much stronger voice,”105 and recommending the creation 
of a single body to deal with issues of gender.106 This would be achieved through 
consolidation of UNIFEM, DAW and OSAGI into two organisational divisions: a 
normative, analytical and monitoring division and a policy advisory and programming 
division. INSTRAW was omitted from the proposal at this stage because of pressures to 
maintain a UN body in the Caribbean and Central American region. The entity would be 
headed by an Executive Director with the rank of Under-Secretary-General and receive 
“adequate, stable and predictable funding” out of the regular budget, supplemented by 
voluntary contributions. The Panel envisaged the work of the gender entity as a way of 
ensuring that “gender equality and women’s empowerment are taken seriously 
throughout the UN system”;107 and noted that “[o]ther UN entities need to dedicate 
significantly more resources to gender mainstreaming.”108   
                                                
101 UN Secretary-General, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit: Note by the Secretary-
General, para. 2, Doc. A/61/583 of 20 November 2006. The “global leaders” were the Heads of State and 
Government who adopted the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit.  
102 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the Areas of 
Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment, Delivering as One, Doc. A/61/583 of 9 
November 2006 [hereinafter Delivering as One]. 
103 Rao, see note 2, 138. See also P. Donovan, Gender Equality Now or Never: A New UN Agency for 
Women, July 2006. 
104 Delivering as One, see note 103, paras. 14-51. The Panel is building on the General Assembly’s 
identification of these horizontal themes.  See, A/RES/60/1, see note 20, para. 169.  
105 Delivering as One, see note 103, para. 49.  
106 Rao, see note 2.  
107 Delivering as One, see note 103 at para. 49.  
108 Ibid., 25, box 2.  
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The need to counter institutional fragmentation was a strong theme throughout 
the Report109 and the Panel’s proposals with respect to strengthening the UN gender 
architecture were integral to this approach. Both institutional reform and gender equality 
were perceived instrumentally as “central to the delivery of effective development 
outcomes.” The Panel accepted the concepts of gender equality, women’s 
empowerment and gender mainstreaming without any critique, explanation or discussion 
of the relationship between them.  
The “gender architecture” proposal included in “Delivering as One” sparked an 
intense debate among UN members.110 Some were reluctant to endorse the formation of 
a new entity before adequate consideration had been given to all of the five key 
elements of the Report’s recommendations: harmonising business practices; delivering 
as one; financial issues; governance issues and gender equality. Gender equality was a 
negotiating chip to some states, which insisted on agreement on all these other issues 
before addressing the last. Others questioned the effectiveness of merging three distinct 
institutions at the operational level. Consultations took place over the next three years 
over various options for the UN’s gender architecture. The UN Secretariat on the basis 
of extensive consultations with member states and NGOs identified the options as: 
maintaining the status quo; creating an autonomous fund or program; establishing a new 
department within the UN Secretariat; and forming a new entity by consolidating existing 
institutions that would have both normative and operational functions.111  
Influential women’s organisations addressed another open letter to UN Member 
States and the Secretary-General at the CSW in 2007112 and launched the campaign 
known as Gender Equality Architecture Reform (GEAR) – a global movement based on 
consultation with and building on the opinions of women worldwide -- at CSW in 2008. 
By 2009, the fourth option had emerged as the most acceptable,113 and in early 2010, 
the Secretary-General issued a blueprint for the “composite entity for gender equality 
and the empowerment of women.”114 This document, which largely foreshadowed the 
terms of the General Assembly’s establishment of UN Women, presented the new 
institution as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. Its normative direction was to 
be shaped by the CSW and its operational direction guided by an Executive Board 
composed of 41 member states drawn from regional groupings and from among major 
financial contributors to the new body. Normative functions would be funded from the 
UN’s regular budget, while operational processes were to be funded from voluntary 
contributions. The major differences between the GEAR proposals and those of the 
Secretary-General were the size of the budget (GEAR had proposed an annual 
minimum budget of US$1 billion and the Secretary-General recommended half that 
                                                
109 See, ibid., para. 10. The report concludes at para. 47 that “[w]hile the UN remains a key actor in 
supporting countries to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment, there is a strong sense that 
the UN system’s contribution has been incoherent, under-resourced and fragmented.”  
110 For a summary of views see, Update on UN Reform and the GEA, Gender Equality Architecture 
Archives, 7 June  2007, <http://www.gearcampaign.org>. 
111 UN Secretariat, Further Details on Institutional Options for Strengthening the Institutional 
Arrangements for Support to Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 5 March 2009, 
<http://www.un.org>. This paper develops upon reform options set out in two earlier notes: UN 
Secretariat, Concept Note on a Strengthened Architecture for Gender Equality and Empowerment of 
Women, 1 August 2007, <http://www.un.org>; UN Secretariat, Note on the United Nations Support to 
Member States on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, 5 June 2008, <https://www.un.org>. 
112 Open Letter regarding Women’s Gender Equality Architecture at the UN from the NGO Linkage 
Caucus taking part in the 51st Commission on the Status of Women, 8 March 2007, 
<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu>. Stephen Lewis, the UN Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa, supported the 
initiative strongly. 
113 A/RES/63/311 of 2 October 2009. 
114 Report of the Secretary-General on the Comprehensive proposal for the composite entity for gender 
equality and the empowerment of women, Doc. A/64/588 of 6 January 2010. 
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amount) and the role of civil society in the new entity.  GEAR sought formal civil society 
participation on the Executive Board, which was not acceptable to many member states 
or consistent with standard UN practice and the proposed intergovernmental body 
mentioned civil society only in general and vague references to consultation. 
The General Assembly finally decided to establish UN Women through a 
resolution entitled “System-Wide Coherence” adopted in July 2010, encompassing all 
five of the key elements mentioned above.115 Its final form merges and consolidates 
DAW, INSTRAW, OSAGI and UNIFEM. Its governance is a multi-tiered 
intergovernmental arrangement through the General Assembly, ECOSOC and CSW.  In 
welcoming the launch of UN Women, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon spoke of the 
significant boost it would give to “UN efforts to promote gender equality, expand 
opportunity and tackle discrimination around the globe.”116 UN Women’s first Executive 
Director, Michelle Bachelet, had considerable cachet as the former President of Chile, 
she was appointed at the level of Under-Secretary-General, the highest level position 
ever devoted to women’s equality within the UN. Her resignation in March 2013 in order 
to re-contest the Chilean presidency is a setback for the institution. 
The constitution of UN Women by the General Assembly has been packaged 
primarily in the language of institutional consistency and only incidentally in normative 
terms. The first half of its foundational Resolution 64/289 is devoted to a range of issues: 
it makes numerous general requests for bureaucratic coordination -- of calendars, 
agendas, work programs, offices and committees; it proposes orientation and training 
programs in UN development activities for delegates of UN member states; it seeks a 
review of the system for evaluating development activities and more funding for them; 
and it encourages efficiency savings within the UN development system. The creation of 
UN Women then occurs without any preamble in the second half of the Resolution. This 
rather incongruous placement implies that the new entity is essentially an instrument for 
bureaucratic streamlining in the area of development – the focus of this aspect of the 
reform package.117 This point is made explicitly in the Resolution where UN Women is 
presented as leading to “more effective coordination, coherence and gender 
mainstreaming across the United Nations system.”118 Its creation therefore appears as 
an example of good-practice management, merging and consolidating the work of four 
existing bodies.  
The Resolution’s provisions on the general principles to guide UN Women move 
away however from the development focus of the first part of the text. The Resolution 
identifies the normative framework of UN Women as the UN Charter, the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, the outcomes of the General Assembly’s Beijing + 5 
special session, and UN “instruments, standards and resolutions” dealing with “gender 
equality and the empowerment and the advancement of women.”119 These references 
are unelaborated in the text of the Resolution and it is striking that the Resolution 
contains no explicit reference to the Women’s Convention or its monitoring Committee, 
CEDAW. CSW, a policy rather than a legal body, is to offer “coherent guidance” to UN 
Women and is supported by it. In this way the ill-defined relationship in UN bodies 
between women’s rights and development continues without elucidation.   
                                                
115 A/RES/64/289 of 21 July 2010. 
116 See UN Women begins its work, 1 January 2011, <http://www.unwomen.org>. 
117 The 2005 UN reforms had resulted in significant reform (and expenditure) in the areas of human rights 
(through the establishment of the Human Rights Council) and peace and security (through the 
establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission); 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 20. The G77 in 
particular was keen to redress what it perceived as the lack of attention to the third pillar of the UN, 
development.    
118 A/RES/64/289, see note 116, para. 52.  
119 Ibid., para 51.a. 
  
 
17 
The documentary history of UN Women includes a significant slippage between 
the terms “gender” and “women”. Although the Secretary-General’s 2010 proposal 
referred to a “composite gender entity,” 120 it described the work of the entity almost 
entirely in terms of women. General Assembly Resolution 64/289 also reflects this 
elision of the concepts of women and gender. The ungainly formal title of the new body 
refers both to gender equality and the empowerment of women, but the short title refers 
only to women.  
UN Women’s First Annual Report121 clarified the body’s “normative support 
functions and operational activities”.122  From the bare words of Resolution 64/289 it has 
expanded the description of its functions: to support UN member states’ deliberations in 
fora “where international policies, standards and norms are negotiated and agreed 
upon”; to lead and coordinate “efforts across the UN system to achieve gender equality” 
and to help states to achieve “real changes in women’s lives.” It has set as priorities: 
“supporting women’s leadership; strengthening women’s economic empowerment; 
ending violence against women; promoting women’s participation in peace and security 
processes; and ensuring that public planning and budgeting responds to the needs and 
rights of women.” The Report details its work in conjunction with other UN (and regional) 
agencies and member states. Strategic partnerships have been formed by Memoranda 
of Understanding with other UN agencies to promote more effective and efficient system 
coordination within the Organisation.123 However it does not seem that UN Women is 
creating strong links between itself and CEDAW, as anticipated by that Committee,124 in 
developing the understanding of the key terms “gender equality” and “non-
discrimination”. There is some inter-action and informal collaboration through 
participation of CEDAW members in expert group meetings and training sessions held 
by UN Women and input by UN Women to consideration of CEDAW General 
Recommendations, but this is apparently on an ad hoc basis. The next section 
discusses the international normative framework with respect to women, highlighting the 
incoherence in the development of its diverse strands and suggesting the UN Women 
could play a role in promoting normative, as well as institutional, coherence.       
 
 
IV. GLOBAL NORMS RELATING TO WOMEN 
 
The formal nomenclature of UN Women - Gender Equality and Women’s 
Empowerment – combines a legal (and political) concept, equality, with a policy 
objective, empowerment. The General Assembly Resolution constituting UN Women 
does not however offer any guidance on the meaning of these terms. The Executive 
Director’s first report to the CSW defined the mission of UN Women as “the elimination 
of discrimination against women and girls, the empowerment of women, and the 
achievement of equality between women and men as partners in and beneficiaries of 
development, human rights, humanitarian action and peace and security.”125 Will these 
                                                
120 Report of the Secretary-General on the Comprehensive proposal for the composite gender equality 
entity and the empowerment of women, see note 115, para. 6.  
121 UN Women, Annual Report 2010-2011. See also UN Women, Annual Report 2011-2012. 
122 A/RES/64/289, see note 116, para 51(b).  
123 Report of the Secretary-General on Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and 
programmes in the United Nations system, Doc. E/2012/61, 25 April 2012, paras. 35-42.  
124 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Doc. A/66/38 (2011), 
Part Two, Annex V, Decision 47/VII, Statement on the establishment of the United Nations Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.  
125 Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 
(UN WOMEN), Report of the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women, delivered to the CSW, Doc. E/CN.6/2011, 10 December 2010 (Michelle 
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goals enrich the existing UN normative framework with respect to women? In this 
section, we discuss the UN’s vocabulary relating to women which clusters around the 
themes of equality, development and peace, articulated first for the UN Decade for 
Women.126 As we will see, these three themes have developed in quite different ways. 
How might UN Women’s mandate of gender equality and women’s empowerment affect 
these developments? 
 
1. Equality 
 
Following the UN Charter provisions, CSW at first promoted the idea of women’s 
equality through legal obligation, drafting a number of treaties recognising women’s 
equal rights to men in various specified spheres of life.127 The two major human rights 
instruments, drafted by the CHR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), adopted in December 1966, provide that the rights they recognise should be 
respected “without distinction of any kind” including sex,128 and, more positively, that state 
parties should ensure the equal right of men and women to enjoy the designated rights.129 
The ICCPR also offers a broad guarantee of equality before the law and a general 
prohibition of discrimination on a number of grounds, including sex.130   
 General international human rights instruments thus provide the skeleton for a body 
of jurisprudence on women’s rights. Since the Vienna World Conference in Human 
Rights in 1993 there have also been regular calls for the integration of the human rights 
of women into the mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity.131 While there 
have been some important advances, such as the General Comments on Equality 
adopted by the monitoring bodies of the two Covenants,132 these developments have not 
borne much fruit. Detailed studies have shown that the interpretation and implementation 
of these provisions have been circumscribed with respect to women. For example, 
although both the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights have recognised specific human rights abuses and constraints experienced 
by women, they have been less ready to address the structural inequality that lies at the 
core of these violations.133 Nor have treaty bodies applied a sex discrimination analysis 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bachelet), para. 5. This repeats the wording of the UN Secretary-General, Comprehensive proposal for 
the composite gender equality entity and the empowerment of women, see note 115 para. 6. 
126 See World Conference of the International Women’s Year, A./RES/3520 (XXX), see note 48. 
127 CSW sponsored the drafting of the following treaties: Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 20 
December 1952, UNTS Vol. 193, No. 2613; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 29 January 
1957, UNTS Vol. 309, No.4468; and Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages, 7 December 1962, UNTS Vol. 521, No. 7525. 
128 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS Vol. 
999, No. 14668 (hereinafter ICCPR); Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS Vol. 993, No. 14531 (hereinafter ICESCR).  
129 ICCPR, ibid., art.3; ICESCR, ibid., art. 3.  
130 ICCPR ibid., art. 26.  
131 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme 
for Action, II, para. 37, Doc. A/CONF.157/23,1993; Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, see note 
51, para. 221.  
132 Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, 20 March 2000, General Comment No. 28: The Equality of Rights 
between Men and Women; Doc. E/C.12/2005/4. 11 August 2005, General Comment No. 16: The Equal 
Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, (art. 2 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).   
133 F. Van Leeuwen, Women’s Rights Are Human Rights: The Practice of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2010, especially 235-251. 
This is a study of the approach of the two Committees with respect to women’s physical integrity.  
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systematically throughout their work. For example while the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights regularly expresses its concern that “women still do not enjoy 
economic, social and cultural rights on the same level as men,”134 and examines many 
ways in which women are disadvantaged in this respect, including female unemployment, 
women in decision-making and domestic violence against women,135 the application of the 
Covenant to other groups such as migrants, persons with disabilities, internally displaced 
or homeless persons is considered without any differentiation between women and men.136 
Similarly, in the context of the international prohibition of torture, the UN treaty bodies have 
a mixed record in applying general principles to women’s lives.137  
The most wide-ranging of the international human rights treaties devoted to women 
is the Women's Convention. The Convention provides a broad definition of discrimination 
in Article 1, covering both equality of treatment and equality of outcome. It requires states 
to take legal and other measures to ensure the practical realisation of the principle of sex 
equality.138 The Convention covers a wide range of areas where state parties must work to 
eliminate discrimination against women including political and public life,139 international 
organisations,140 education,141 employment,142 healthcare,143 financial credit,144 cultural 
life,145 the rural sector,146 and the law.147 In this way the Women’s Convention transcends 
the traditional divide between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights, illustrated by the separate development of the ICESCR and the ICCPR. The 
Women’s Convention attempts to overcome the dichotomy enshrined in many legal 
systems and replicated in international law, between public and private spheres of activity 
in which law is used to regulate public areas such as politics or education, but leaves 
private areas such as the family unregulated.148 Thus the Convention explicitly affirms 
women's right to equality in a limited way within the family149 and with respect to legal 
contracts and other private instruments.150  
The Women’s Convention provides for “temporary special measures” to accelerate 
substantive sex equality.151 While Sandra Fredman has argued that this provision 
“implicitly assumes that gender specific treatment is prima facie invidious and 
unacceptable,” rather than an integral aspect of equality,152 CEDAW has asserted that 
                                                
134 E.g., Doc. E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5 of 19 November 2010, Concluding  Observations: Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. 
135 E.g., Doc. E/C.12/LKA/CO/2-4, of 9 December 2010: Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, paras. 15, 
16, 18, 24.  
136 E.g., Doc. E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5, see note 135, paras. 12, 13; Doc. E/C.12/LKA/CO/2-4, ibid.,paras. 14, 
29, 31.  
137 E.g. A. Edwards, “The ‘Feminizing’ of Torture under International Human Rights Law”, LJIL 19 (2006), 
350 et seq.; A. Edwards, Violence against Women under International Human Rights Law, 2011, 198-262. 
138 CEDAW, article 2, see note 73.  
139 Ibid., art. 7.  
140 Ibid., art. 8.  
141 Ibid., art. 10.  
142 Ibid., art. 11.   
143 Ibid., art. 12. 
144 Ibid., art. 13(b). 
145 Ibid., art. 13(c). 
146 Ibid., art. 14. 
147 Ibid., art. 15. 
148 H. Charlesworth/ C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 2000, 30-31.  
149 CEDAW, article 16, see note 73. 
150 Ibid., art. 15 (3). 
151 Ibid., art. 4(1); Doc. A/59/38 (2004), Annex 1, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 25 (art. 4 (1) of  the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures). 
152 S. Fredman, “Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New Definition of 
Equal Rights”, in: Ineke Boerefijn et al. (eds), Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating de facto Equality 
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“special” must not be allowed to cast women as weak or vulnerable.153 In the Committee’s 
view, Article 4 provides a means for the achievement of “de facto or substantive equality 
for women, rather than an exception to the norms of non-discrimination and equality.”154  
 While discrimination is defined in international instruments,155 equality is not, 
meaning that those applying the instruments, including states parties, and the UN human 
rights treaty bodies, must develop their own understanding of the latter concept. In 
practice, the international legal understanding of equality is often elided with the notion of 
non-discrimination: equality and non-discrimination are taken to be positive and negative 
statements of the same principle.156 In other words, equality means the absence of 
discrimination and non-discrimination between designated groups will result in equality 
across members of those groups.  This approach limits the transformative possibilities of 
the idea of equality, confining it to a guarantee of equal treatment. In the context of 
women’s equality, such an understanding requires women to conform to a world defined by 
male lives. Moreover, by dealing with individual cases of discrimination rather than 
structural inequality, the notion of equal opportunity can solve some discrete, individual 
problems of discrimination, but fails to address the underlying causes of women’s 
inequality more generally.  
 The linkage of equality and non-discrimination also emphasises fault by particular 
actors in particular cases and distracts attention from the acceptance of many forms of 
inequality as normal, culturally sanctioned, or based on accepted principles of “merit.”157 
There are some important exceptions, for example CEDAW’s approach in the inquiry 
procedure provided for in the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention. In its 
investigation into hundreds of cases of murder and disappearance of women in Ciudad 
Juaréz in Mexico, the Committee examined inequality in a structurally violent society. It 
found that focusing on the crimes as isolated cases did not address the underlying 
sociocultural problems and recommended that specific policies on equality were needed 
and a “gender perspective” adopted in all public policies.158 It emphasised the need for “a 
global and integrated response, a strategy aimed at transforming existing sociocultural 
patterns,”159 although the reality of CEDAW’s recommendations fell short of this 
objective. The Cotton Field case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
similarly pointed to the impact of sexual stereotyping on the failure of the Mexican 
authorities to investigate violence against women adequately.160 The judgment pays 
attention to structural inequalities faced by women. The Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women has also pointed to the transformative potential of reparations whereby 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 2003, 111 et seq. 
153 CEDAW, General recommendation No. 25, see note 152, para. 21.  
154 Ibid., para. 14.  
155 E.g. Art. 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 21 
December 1965, UNTS Vol. 660, No. 9464; CEDAW, see note 73, art. 1.  
156 See e.g., W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law, 1983, 287-288. 
157 I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, 195-196. 
158 Doc. CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO of 27 January 2005, Report on Mexico produced by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention, and Reply from the Government of Mexico, Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, para. 34. 
159 Ibid., para. 287.  
160 Gonzalez et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, IACHR, 
Ser. C, No. 205, 16 November 2009. 
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they may “aspire, to the extent possible, to subvert, instead of reinforce, pre-existing 
structural inequality that may be at the root causes of the violence”161  
Despite the narrow language of the Women’s Convention, the dynamic nature of 
international instruments allows for progressive interpretation and development of 
international law.162 This provides a valuable tool for the elaboration of the concept of 
substantive equality.  
  
2. Development 
 
The area of development has seen the least normative development with respect 
to women’s lives. Reflecting the growing Third World membership of the UN, from the 
late 1950s CSW’s focus turned increasingly to the advancement of women in and 
through economic development.163 This work had little impact initially and at the outset 
of the Second International Development Decade, 1970-1980, the first International 
Development Strategy did not refer to women in any detail. This prompted CSW to 
announce a detailed “Programme of concerted international action for the advancement 
of women.”164 The Programme addressed the development of women, for example 
through minimum targets relating to education, employment, health, and public life, and 
sought to increase women’s contribution to the various economic and social sectors 
relevant to a state’s development.165 Equality and development were linked in the 
themes for the International Women’s Year (1975)166 and subsequently the UN Decade 
for Women. This reflected heightened scepticism about the value of traditional forms of 
development for women.167  
In the 1980s and 1990s, CSW’s focus turned to the role women played in 
development, both as beneficiaries and as agents for change, identifying obstacles to 
women’s participation in development and women’s economic participation. The Beijing 
                                                
161 Doc. A/HRC/14/22 of 23 April 2010, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, para. 31, (by Rashida Manjoo); see also R. Rubio-Marin (ed.), The Gender of 
Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies while Redressing Human Rights Violations, 2009. 
162 Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 of 16 December 2010, CEDAW, General recommendation No. 28 on the core 
obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, para. 1.  
163 In 1957 the General Assembly invited CSW to pursue its efforts to improve “the status of women 
throughout the world”: Seminars on the Status of Women, A/RES/1163 (XII) of 26 November 1957.  The 
UNGA “noted with appreciation” CSW’s work and progress made with respect to women’s rights.  In 1962, 
the UNGA initiated a “unified long-term United Nations programme for the advancement of women” in 
which CSW was invited to cooperate. United Nations assistance for the advancement of women in 
developing countries, A/RES/1777 (XVII) of 7 December 1962. 
164 Programme of Concerted International Action for the Advancement of Women, A/RES/2716 (XXV) of 
15 December 1970.  Pietilä describes this as an “impressive counter-move on the part of CSW.” Pietilä, 
see note 2, 38.  
165 Programme of Concerted International Action for the Advancement of Women, Annex, see note 165. 
This instrumental approach is repeated, e.g. in the Preamble to the Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women: “Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, 
the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal 
terms with men in all fields.” 
166 A/RES/3010 (XXVII), see note 47, provides for intensive action: to promote equality between men and 
women; to ensure the full integration of women in the total development effort; and to recognise the 
importance of women’s contribution to the strengthening of world peace.  
167 Doc. A/CONF.116/28/REV.1 of 26 July 1985, Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise 
the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, para.103: 
“While during the earlier, [sic] part of the Decade the belief that economic growth would automatically 
benefit women was more widely shared, an evaluation of the experience of the Decade has shed 
considerable doubt on this over-simplified premise.” See also, G. Sen/ C. Grown, Development, Crises, 
and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Perspectives, 1987. 
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Platform for Action has played an ambivalent role in this regard. On the one hand, it 
acknowledged that women’s contribution to development is seriously underestimated 
and that economic globalisation can exacerbate inequalities between women and men. 
It has been described as articulating “a model of economic growth that is egalitarian, 
inclusive, participatory, people-centred, sustainable”.168 On the other hand, the Platform 
ignores the role of global capitalism in promoting inequality, seeing the problem for 
women as their lack of access to, and opportunity to participate in, the unchallenged 
economic system and in redress seeking primarily to ensure their inclusion in economic 
policy-making so as to minimise the adverse effects on them of structural adjustment 
and stabilisation measures.169  
In the 21st century development objectives for women have shifted from the 
Beijing Platform to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).170 The Beijing+10 
Declaration in 2005 emphasised that “full and effective implementation of the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action is essential to achieving the internationally agreed 
development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration.”171 
Participants in a panel session held during the 49th CSW meeting that year took a more 
cautious and critical approach, noting the need for a rights-based approach to 
implementation of the MDGs, especially women’s human rights.172 They also observed 
the limited scope given to gender equality and women’s empowerment in efforts for 
realisation of the MDGs: generally such actions are seen as relevant only to Goal 3 
(Promote gender equality and empower women) without any connection being made 
with the Beijing Platform for Action or the Women’s Convention.173 Moreover, the 
measurement of gender equality and women’s empowerment is in very limited terms: 
representation in public office, enrolment in education and economic activity.  In any 
event, the MDGs are a set of policy goals which do not purport to be comprehensive or 
to have any legal force. UN Women has urged that gender equality and women’s 
empowerment be put at the heart of the MDGs174 and fully integrated into the post-2015 
international development framework,175 but it has not challenged the neo-liberal 
economic status quo that undermines social justice and furthers inequalities.176 
                                                
168 The impact of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action on the full achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals, see note 70, para. 119.   
169 D. Otto, “Holding Up Half the Sky but for Whose Benefit? A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World 
Conference on Women”, Austl. Feminist L. J. 6 (1996), 7 et seq. 
170 United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/RES/ 55/2 of 18 September 2000.  
171 Doc. E/CN.6/2005/L.1 of 3 March 2005, Declaration issued by the Commission on the Status of 
Women at its 49th Session, Agenda Item 3(c), para. 3; Doc. E/CN.6/2005/11, 2005 of 22 March 2005, 
Commission on the Status of Women: Report on the 49th Session, CSW, 49th Sess., Feb. 28 – Mar. 22, 
2005, 1. 
172 CSW, Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and to the special session of the General 
Assembly entitled “Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century”: 
implementation of strategic objectives and action in the critical areas of concern and further actions and 
initiatives, 28 February-11 March 2005, Summary submitted by the moderator Kyung-wha Kang, Doc. 
E/CN.6/2005/CRP.8 of 9 March 2005, para. 3, <http://www.un.org>. 
173 Charlotte Bunch has observed the limitations of the MDG process for women and that women have 
had to work hard to ensure their inclusion. Following the Millennium Summit + 5 women concluded “that 
gains had been made but that governments and the UN still fell far short of both the development and the 
gender equality goals espoused.” Bunch, see note 50, 503.  
174 UN Women, Progress of The World’s Women in Pursuit of Justice, 2011, 121.  
175 UN Women, The Future Women Want: A Vision of Sustainable Development for All, 2012 (prepared 
ahead of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (June 2012)).  
176 UN Women has focused its interventions for enhancing women’s empowerment on legal protection 
and recognition for women in specific situations, for example the informal economy and cross-border 
trading in Africa and the legal rights of domestic workers. It has also sought partnerships with the private 
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3. Peace 
 
The third normative theme linked to women in international law is peace. As early 
as 1915 the International Women’s Congress urged that women have a voice in the 
peace settlement that would take place at the end of the First World War.177 Seventy 
years later, in 1975, the Nairobi Conference identified women and peace as a major 
arena for UN activity, but there was little normative development in the area for the next 
25 years. After a sustained campaign by some UN member states and women’s NGOs, 
particularly the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in 2000.178  
In line with the Security Council’s mandate for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the Resolution shifted the discourse to “women, peace and 
security.” It drew attention, first, to women’s participation in peace processes and 
second, to the inclusion of a “gender perspective” “in all efforts for the maintenance and 
promotion of peace and security.”179 The first aim was directed towards governments 
and the UN Secretary-General, and urged greater representation of women in all stages 
of conflict prevention, management and resolution.180 The second aim defined a gender 
perspective as taking account of the “special needs of women and girls” in post-conflict 
processes and state building.181 Men were referred to only in the context of disarmament 
where “all those involved” were encouraged “to consider the different needs of female 
and male ex-combatants”. The Resolution also called for compliance with existing 
international humanitarian and human rights law and for the protection of women and 
girls “from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse”. 
Finally the Resolution called for “a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and 
girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace 
processes and conflict resolution.”182 
Security Council Resolution 1325 was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and thus does not formally bind UN member states. It nevertheless prompted 
considerable institutional activity: the UN launched training programs and developed a 
plethora of policies, action plans and guidelines.183 It created an inter-agency forum 
“United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict” in 2007, bringing together 13 
agencies as a “critical joint UN system-wide initiative to guide advocacy, knowledge-
                                                                                                                                                        
sector through the launching of the Women’s Empowerment Principles: Equality Means Business. UN 
Women, Annual Report 2010-2011, see note 122. 
177 J.Addams, Emily Balch and Alice Hamilton, Women at the Hague: The International Congress of 
Women and its Results, 2003.   
178 See, F. Hill, “Nongovernmental Organizations’ Role in the Buildup and Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325”, Signs 28, 2003, 1255 et seq.; See also, D. Otto, “The Security Council’s 
Alliance of Gender Legitimacy”, in: H. Charlesworth/ J-M. Coicaud (eds), Fault Lines of International 
Legitimacy, 2010, 239 et seq. (256-258). 
179 Security Council Resolution 1325 has been described by Rachel Mayanja, UN Special Adviser of the 
Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, in 2010 as an important ‘international 
development landmark.’ See, R. Mayanja, “Armed Conflict and Women – 10 Years of Security Council 
Resolution 1325”, UN Chron. XLVII  (2010), <http://www.un.org/>.  
180 These themes had been incorporated in the Beijing Platform for Action as Strategic Objective E.1, 
which called for increased participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and for 
the integration of a gender perspective in the resolution of armed or other conflicts: Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action, see note 51, para. 144. 
181 This time the reference is to “particular” needs.  
182 In fact there were two studies: United Nations, Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 2002; E. Rehn/ E. J. Sirleaf, 
Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women 
and Women’s Role in Peace-Building, 2002.  
183 Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security, Doc. S/2010/498 of 28 
September 2010, para. 122.  
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building, resource mobilisation, and joint programming around sexual violence in 
conflict.”184 The Security Council held open debates and “Arria formula” meetings185 on 
women and peace and security. The Secretary-General’s 2004 report to the Security 
Council on transitional justice replicated much of the language of Resolution 1325.186 
UN Member States adopted national action plans; civil society, in particular women’s 
NGOs, used the resolution in conflict areas, to formulate demands for political and 
disarmament processes.187 Despite this flurry of activity, at the end of the decade, the 
Secretary-General conceded that little had changed on the ground.188 Even the adoption 
of “System-Wide Action Plans” across UN agencies had had limited effect.189  
Over the next decade the Security Council adopted four further resolutions to 
draw attention to the “disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women 
and girls.”190 Although they are formally directed at protection of civilians “including 
women and girls,” the language emphasises “the egregious and inhumane treatment of 
women and girls.”191 Resolution 1820, adopted in 2008 focussed on sexual violence in 
war, demanding that parties to armed conflict take measures “to protect civilians, 
including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence”192 and end impunity for 
such crimes.  Two Security Council resolutions (1888 and 1889) adopted in 2009 sought 
women’s participation in decision-making about both peacemaking and peacebuilding 
and the cessation of and accountability for the commission of crimes of sexual 
violence.193 Following Security Council resolution 1888 a team of experts has been 
established working on issues relating to the rule of law in conflict countries, with a focus 
on strengthening national capacities for effective criminal investigations and trials. The 
final resolution in this quartet was adopted late in 2010. Security Council Resolution 
1960 expressed the Council’s “deep concern” at the slow progress made on the issue of 
sexual violence in armed conflict, especially against women and children, reaffirming the 
earlier resolutions and the Council’s commitment to the cessation of all acts of sexual 
violence.194 Resolution 1960 went further than its predecessors with respect to 
accountability in requesting the Secretary-General to compile lists of those who were 
“credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other 
forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict.” It suggested the possible use of 
                                                
184 See “UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict”, Strategic Framework 2011-12, 2011, 3, 
<http://nobelwomensinitiative.org>. 
185 The Arria Formula is an informal arrangement that allows the Security Council greater flexibility to be 
briefed about international peace and security issues. See, J. Paul, “The Arria Formula”, Global Policy 
Forum, October 2003, <http://www.globalpolicy.org>. 
186 UN Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 
Doc. S/2004/616 of 23 August 2004, paras. 15, 17, 25, 33, 35, 64. 
187 Developments in all three arenas are discussed in the UN Secretary-General’s Annual Reports on 
Women and Peace and Security and summarized in UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
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these lists by the UN, including through sanctions,195 implying that the Security Council 
may be prepared to exercise its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the first 
time in this context. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict has indeed named in her reports such parties (armed groups, militia 
and, in the case of Syria, Syrian Government forces, the intelligence forces and the 
Shabbiha militia).  At the least this “naming and shaming” allows for increased pressure 
on such parties, while it may also be first steps in more coercive action “through the 
adoption of targeted and graduated measures by relevant sanctions committees”.196 
The Security Council has also included provisions relating to women in country-
specific resolutions. Many of these provisions follow identical lines however and are 
either general references to Security Council Resolution 1325 or “zero tolerance” 
clauses with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse by members of UN peacekeeping 
missions.197  
The Security Council resolutions of the 2000s depend on sometimes 
contradictory images of women and men, and of gender roles.198 These include on the 
one hand women as agents of political change through preventing and resolving 
conflicts and engaging in peacebuilding, and on the other women, girls and children as a 
group with “special needs,” requiring protection, by a strong (male) authority to 
determine the proper measures for their security.199 The countries to which the Security 
Council’s specific resolutions are directed also imply that the threat of sexual violence is 
located particularly in the global South and that the “muscular humanitarianism” of the 
international community is a vital source of protection.200 The language of women’s (or 
gender) equality appears only fleetingly in one of the resolutions, Resolution 1889, 
which refers to the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women in 
post-conflict situations within UN missions, calling on the Peacebuilding Commission to 
give attention to mobilising resources for advancing gender equality.201  
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Broader feminist agendas of disarmament, reduction of military expenditure or 
restrictions on small arms appear to have had no impact on the resolutions.202 They do 
not address the links between violence against women in armed conflict and structural 
bases such as militarisation, the political economy of conflict or the struggle for control of 
economic resources.203 Nor does increasing the number of female peacekeepers 
challenge militarism; it simply inserts women into the existing hegemonic process.204 
The resolutions also concentrate on sexual violence as the major concern for women 
during armed conflict, displacing all the other dangers which women experience during 
armed conflict such as disappearances of family members and destruction of property 
and food sources for which women as the primary carers within their family and 
community have responsibility for providing.205 None of the resolutions refers explicitly to 
sexual violence against men and boys, a significant phenomenon in armed conflict.206 
Indeed the implication is that men and boys are only involved as perpetrators of sexual 
violence.  
The adoption of Resolution 1325 in particular has provided a smokescreen for 
inaction in some post-conflict contexts. For example, the UN’s Senior Gender Advisor in 
Nepal in 2007-2008, Ratna Kapur, reported that the Resolution was used as a 
mechanism to limit the scope of her work. Misreading the Resolution, the UN Mission 
regarded Nepali women as objects of welfare and their roles as combatants and political 
actors were overlooked. Kapur noted that “[a]dvice sought from the gender section by 
senior management was often limited to providing statistics or recommending token 
women to invite as speakers on panels, or providing inputs into speeches by the 
[UNMIN] leadership that were largely watered down or transformed into insipid remarks 
on gender.” In her view, Resolution 1325 “project[ed] an illusion of something being 
done in the area of gender by the international community, including UNMIN, without 
very much actually being done on the ground.” 207 
More generally, the call in the resolutions to include more women in peace 
processes has had little practical effect. A study of 24 major peace processes since 
1992 reveals a small number of women acting as negotiators, as delegates of 
negotiating parties, or as signatories to peace agreements.208 The UN itself has never 
appointed a woman to be a chief mediator in a peace process.209 Indeed the Security 
Council has never taken the step of drawing attention to the absence of women in a 
particular peace process. CEDAW, however, has taken this up with respect to specific 
conflicts.210 A review of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2010 found that it had 
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failed to live up to its explicit mandate to take women and gender into account in its 
work.211 Another study of the terms of peace agreements found that only 16 per cent of 
peace agreements contained any references to women, beyond a general equality 
clause, although the adoption of Resolution 1325 had prompted an increase, especially 
if the UN was involved in the process.212 Of course participation of women whether in 
peace processes, political bodies or governance does not of itself guarantee a feminist – 
or even women-oriented - perspective. Women, like men, bring a diversity of viewpoints 
to the table. Nevertheless failure to ensure women’s participation in accordance with 
Resolution 1325 ignores the gendered nature of conflict and undermines women’s 
equality.213  
 Within the UN, the theme of women and peace has been elaborated in particular 
contexts that have been priorities in the post-cold war context:  peace, security, post-
conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice. In conjunction with the work of the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals there has been some significant advances. The Security 
Council has recognised gender and sex-based crimes as constituting a threat to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and effectively included within the 
jurisdiction of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the Statute of the ICC.214 
UN Women too is working with other parts of the UN and within member states to 
enhance women’s participation in post-conflict negotiations and political structures, to 
challenge impunity and to provide training to UN peacekeepers prior to their 
deployment.215  
 These developments have met with ambivalent responses.216 Referring to women 
in Security Council resolutions and including some crimes against women in 
international criminal law do not address fundamental power imbalances between 
women and men. Another critique is the protective stance taken towards women that 
assumes their vulnerability, for example by the consistent conjunction of “women and 
children”. In the same vein, the “zero tolerance” policy of sexual contact with local 
people and UN peacekeepers has been criticised for its insufficient attention to “the 
grinding poverty or the poorly resourced charity-based models of aid that produce 
economies of survival sex”.217  
4. Assessment 
 
This review of the elements of the international normative structures relating to 
women shows that there have been significant developments. The UN Charter adopted 
the principle of equal treatment of women and men; the Women’s Convention then 
endorsed the norm of non-discrimination on the basis of sex against women; in the 
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1990s the idea of gender emerged as a tool to respond to the situation of women and it 
featured in programs (gender mainstreaming), principles (gender equality) and as tools 
(gender disaggregated data, gender analysis). In the new century, the UN’s peace and 
security framework has emphasised both protective and participatory norms, as 
exemplified in the Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security.  
The title of UN Women invokes two distinct concepts -- “gender equality” and 
“empowerment of women”. We consider first some issues of terminology and 
symbolism. What is the significance of these terms and how do they fit into the 
developments sketched above? The terms “women”, “sex” and “gender” have been 
deployed at different times as a shorthand acknowledgment of the differences between 
the economic, social, political and familial positions of women and men observed in 
most contexts across the globe. Of course all terminology in this area is controversial 
and unstable in some way: for example the category “women” is a complex one in an 
international context, inevitably reproducing an overbroad identity. In Denise Riley’s 
words the term “women” “conflates the attributed, the imposed, and the lived, and then 
sanctifies the resulting mélange.”218 It has, however, some value in mobilising political 
action.  
As we have seen, one goal of the UN set out in its Charter was to achieve the 
equality of men and women and to ensure that sex was not a basis for the denial of 
human rights. The notion of sex became synonymous with women. The major UN treaty 
elaborating the duty of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, the Women’s 
Convention,219 was directed solely at women’s claims,220 “emphasizing that women have 
suffered, and continue to suffer from various forms of discrimination because they are 
women.”221  These developments illustrate what Joan Scott has identified as a paradox 
of feminism: it seeks to discard sexual difference as a legitimate political criterion while 
at the same time relying on sexual difference to make claims in the name of women. In 
other words, feminism reinforces the sexual differences it seeks to eradicate.222  
The terms “feminist” and “feminism” are never mentioned in international fora, 
presumably because they appear to carry strident political baggage. However, the term 
“gender”, drawn from feminist theory, began to emerge on international agendas in the 
late 1980s. The Nairobi “Forward Looking Strategies” referred to “gender-based 
discrimination” and sought changed attitudes towards gender roles.223 CEDAW used the 
term in a 1989 General Recommendation encouraging the collection of statistics,224 and 
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a 1992 General Recommendation on violence against women.225 At the Beijing 
Conference in 1995 the deliberate move away from the term “sex” to “gender” was 
strongly contested, primarily by those with a religious agenda:226 it endorsed a 
commitment to gender equality as well as to non-discrimination on the basis of sex.227 
The rationale for the shift was that the concept of gender recognised “that the entire 
structure of society, and all relations between men and women within it, had to be re-
evaluated.”228 According to the UN, the term “gender” drew attention to the necessary 
“fundamental restructuring of society and its institutions” to allow women to be “fully 
empowered to take their rightful place as equal partners with men in all aspects of 
life”.229 In this sense “gender equality” was seen as relational and engaging the interests 
of men as well as women – an important strategic objective. Similarly CEDAW has 
asserted that the term “sex” refers to “biological differences between men and women” 
while “gender” means “socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and 
men and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting 
in hierarchical relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power 
and rights favouring men and disadvantaging women.”230After the Beijing Conference, 
“gender mainstreaming” rapidly became the dominant international institutional strategy 
to achieve women’s equality.231 It was a potentially radical response, bringing the issue 
of sex equality out of the specialised women’s institutional zone and insisting on its 
relevance to all areas of activity. It lost its radical edge in its bureaucratic translation, 
however, reducing some gender mainstreaming projects to head counts of women.232  
As the full name of UN Women and its mandate illustrate,233 the terms “women” 
and “gender” are used more or less interchangeably in the UN, even if this has little 
intellectual coherence. The term “sex” is in decline and “gender” has become a synonym 
for women. This reading of the term excludes other contentious signifiers of sexuality.234 
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It links gender with biology, implying that gender is a fixed, objective fact about a person 
and does not capture the ways that gender is constructed in society to make some 
actions seem natural and others controversial. Understanding gender as essentially 
about women ignores the relational nature of gender, the role of power relations and the 
way that structures of subordination are reproduced.235 It allows problems facing women 
to be understood as the product of particular cultures, lack of participation in public 
arenas or lack of information or skills and obscures the way that gender shapes our 
understanding of the world. “Gender equality” allows men to claim equality rights, 
without recognition that women may thereby lose them. And the term excludes men and 
forms of male power from analysis. As Ines Smyth has argued: 
 
The association between the term gender on one hand and mainstreaming – with 
its bureaucratic associations – on the other has created a “chain of equivalence” 
[whereby new meanings emerge according to the proximity between chosen 
words] that hides the element of power relations so essential to the original 
feminist understanding of the term.236 
 
In other words, gender mainstreaming has become a managerial activity that can be 
addressed through increasing participation and providing technical assistance, rather 
than a political one requiring evaluation of root causes and systemic change.237   
What force does UN Women’s endorsement of “empowerment of women” have? 
The earliest UN instruments addressing women speak of “women’s advancement,” 
which appears to refer to improvement in their status in the public sphere.238 This 
language was supplemented in Article 3 of the Women’s Convention which seeks to 
achieve women’s “full development and advancement” and by the concept of 
“empowerment” in the1995 Beijing Platform for Action.239 The idea of women’s 
empowerment entered the UN’s lexicon from the world of development, but its meaning 
was not defined in the Beijing Platform. Drawing on religion, self-help manuals and 
business management, it has come to mean “self-generated positive change” or the free 
choice of individuals to fulfil their own potential, a counterweight to male power over 
women.240 Thus UN documents describe “the core of empowerment [as] the ability of a 
woman to control her own destiny through equal capabilities, equal access to resources 
and opportunities” and “the agency to use those rights, capabilities, resources, and 
opportunities to make strategic choices and decisions,” which entails living free from the 
fear of coercion and violence.241 In this context, empowerment rests on a model of the 
empowered citizen in a free market, liberal economy, whereby independence and self-
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sufficiency provide a path to equality and autonomy, and the state can legitimately 
reduce its support for vulnerable groups.242  
Although the concept of empowerment is typically deployed in a general and 
vague way, it has been quantified in specific fields, such as economic participation 
(numbers of women in the paid labour force and their remuneration on an equal basis 
with men); economic opportunity (quality of working conditions, challenging the sexual 
division of labour and the feminisation of poverty);  political participation (women’s 
representation in formal and informal decision-making bodies and in policy-making); 
education; and health and well-being.243 Feminist scholars have criticised this move to 
render empowerment as an attainable end-product of development, rather than as an 
ongoing process, on the basis that it promotes individualism and consumerism and does 
not pay enough attention to social context.244 Issues such as women’s unpaid labour 
and their role as the “safety net of last resort” are also significant. In the widespread 
retreat from the welfare state, focus on empowerment might suggest weakness in those 
who need care and are not self-reliant. It burdens women with the responsibility for 
overcoming their poverty, exploitation and disempowerment,245 shifting responsibility 
away from the state’s obligations to protect, respect and fulfil their human rights. 
The terms gender equality and empowerment of women used in the title of UN 
Women appear to link disparate initiatives and to give them greater coherence, although 
generality and abstraction of these concepts also avoids disagreement on what the 
concepts entail in any given situation.246 Institutional attention to women’s lives can 
readily become bureaucratised and ritualised, for example holding an annual meeting on 
gender while deflecting proposals for concrete change.   
The impetus for legal reform has come largely from civil society, notably women’s 
groups. Taking advantage of the diversity of institutional structures, women activists and 
practitioners have found spaces that were receptive to their aims.247 However the 
success of civil society strategies in seeking alliances with international institutions has 
had many negotiating costs.248 A sign of the fragility of the normative system is the 
controversy over whether to hold a Fifth World Conference on Women.249 NGOs and 
some UN member states fear that such an event may lead to revision of the Beijing 
Platform for Action, for example to insert references to culture and traditional practices 
as legitimate restraints on women’s assertions of rights.250 
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The creation of UN Women offers an opportunity to strengthen the international 
normative system but the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development illustrates 
the political difficulties in such a project. UN Women submitted a contribution in advance 
to the Conference, The Future Women Want: A Vision of Sustainable Development for 
All, but it avoided contentious topics such as women’s reproductive rights. While the 
Conference Outcome Document makes general references to gender equality and 
women’s empowerment, language on women’s reproductive rights was negotiated out of 
the text. It contains a commitment to “promote” women’s equal access to basic services, 
including addressing women’s sexual and reproductive health, rather than “ensuring” 
them as in an earlier draft text.251  
 
V. A NORMATIVE AGENDA FOR UN WOMEN 
 
The creation of UN Women is a moment of great promise because of the 
unprecedented focus on the institutional architecture for the advancement of women. Its 
mandate for “gender equality” means that UN Women, like other bodies, must interpret 
the undefined concept and apply this understanding in its work. This gives it an 
opportunity for developing a transformative interpretation of substantive equality.  UN 
Women’s two Annual Reports do not suggest however that the body sees it as part of its 
role to challenge the global structures that sustain women’s subordination. Rather it 
creates a pool of expertise to address routine forms of discrimination against women, to 
offer technical assistance and expert knowledge to states, with respect to issues such 
as law and judicial reform, governance, capacity building and gender budgeting. For 
example it asserts that “ending violence against women requires know-how”, adoption of 
appropriate legislation, action plans and budgets, prevention programs and services and 
awareness campaigns.252 Its work is practical and focused but does not address the root 
causes of violence against women, for example by referring to the work of successive 
special rapporteurs on violence against women with respect to its causes. While 
accepting the continuing need for such scrutiny, expertise and practical assistance, UN 
Women could also play a valuable role in addressing the foundational weaknesses of 
the normative structure relating to women in international law, which has overall taken a 
minimalist approach to women’s equality and encouraged integration into pre-existing 
structures. In this section, we suggest that the goal of substantive equality should be 
defined and emphasised by UN Women.   
The idea of equality has some resonance in an international legal system that is 
formally constructed on the principle of sovereign equality between states.253 However, 
sovereign equality has had little practical application other than in the voting system of 
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some international institutions, most notably the UN General Assembly. In other 
contexts such as claims of “unequal” treaties, or the “equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples,” the concept of equality has been contested, or discounted.254 Indeed it has 
been argued that international law, shaped by the unequal relationships of colonialism, 
has never developed a coherent theory of equality or of inequality,255 and that it fails to 
recognise the possibility of inherently coercive relationships.256 Thus attempts by weaker 
states to draw attention to economic inequality such as through the campaign for a New 
International Economic Order, or the formulation of a right to development, have 
failed.257 Benedict Kingsbury has identified:  
 
… a relationship of mutual containment between sovereignty and inequality. The 
system of sovereignty at least notionally precludes some forms of inequality, 
while helping exclude other forms of inequality from real consideration. Inequality 
limits sovereignty where hierarchies are established among different political and 
legal units.258 
 
Extending Kingsbury’s observations, the attachment to sovereignty in international law 
also shields inequalities within states from international scrutiny. The notion of equality 
focuses on limited goals, providing access to already constituted institutions and orders. 
For example in In Larger Freedom, his blueprint for UN reform, Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan listed the following measures to achieve the goal of “gender equality”: increasing 
primary school completion and secondary school access for girls; ensuring secure 
tenure of property to women; ensuring access to reproductive health services; promoting 
equal access to labour markets; providing opportunity for greater representation in 
government decision-making bodies; and supporting direct interventions to protect 
women from violence.259 Implementation of such measures would undoubtedly enhance 
the lives of many women but overall they simply increase women’s participation in 
existing institutions and structures and do not challenge the hierarchies of power and 
wealth on which they are built. 
 This reluctance to deal with the causes of inequality between women and men is 
an aspect of a larger failure in the area of human rights. Susan Marks has observed the 
focus of the human rights movement on explanatory analysis, and its lack of 
engagement with the root causes of human rights abuses.260 She has identified three 
principal problems: the investigation of causes is prematurely curtailed, effects are 
treated as causes and causes are identified only to be set aside. There is a similar 
pattern with respect to sex equality:  little attention is paid to the reproduction of 
inequality within global frameworks; the effects of inequality, such as the low numbers of 
women in public life, are understood as causes of inequality; sex inequality is traced to 
“deficiencies of leadership or accountability, or quirks of local history or culture”261 and 
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technical solutions are proposed to tinker at its edges. As in the human rights area 
generally, the beneficiaries of inequality between women and men are invisible: in 
Marks’ words, “those who (directly or indirectly) live off the practices and processes that 
victimise others have been allowed to remain comfortably out of sight.”262 Analysis 
centres on how women experience inequality, rather than on how men experience their 
position of greater power, which is viewed as natural and uncontroversial. The discourse 
of women’s empowerment and gender equality assumes that women can be 
empowered without men changing their lives, losing some power, or giving up the 
trappings of privilege.   
Substantive equality provides a sharper tool to respond to women’s global inequality. 
Elaborating such an idea would require UN Women to build on the thin fabric contained 
in its constitutional resolution. It could draw on the principle of equality explained by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice as long ago as 1935 as encompassing 
“equality in fact”, which “may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to 
attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations”,263 that is, 
objectively unequal situations should not be treated equally.  
Feminist accounts of equality do not necessarily rely on comparators to demonstrate 
unequal treatment but instead emphasise the influence of structural and ideological 
power relationships between women and men that uphold women’s subordination.264 
Thus substantive equality between women and men requires not only redressing the 
disadvantageous practical impact of apparently neutral laws and practices but also 
focusing on the “asymmetrical structures of power, dominance and disadvantage at 
work in society”.265 These structures are maintained by complex systems of stereotyping 
on the basis of sex.266 
Substantive equality is also different from the notion of non-discrimination, which rests 
on a commitment to formal equality – treating people in the same situation in the same 
way. The goal of formal equality for women when compared to similarly-situated men 
has a blunt edge because, across the world, women’s lives differ in so many ways to 
men’s. Reproduction, economic opportunities, education, and political and social 
contexts, for example, all mark women’s lives as distinct to those of men.267 The 
language of non-discrimination makes it difficult to emphasise the particularity of 
women’s lives in ways that benefit women: it compresses women’s lives into 
cumbersome and inaccurate categories. It also precludes the possibility of special 
programs for women.  
Substantive equality is also distinct from the notion of equality of opportunity, which 
takes into account the unequal playing fields for women and men in assessing equality, 
recognising that formally equal treatment may in fact exacerbate inequality. Equality of 
opportunity is more concerned with allowing women entry to public spheres of activity, 
than with how they fare once they have gained entry. These two approaches have 
tended to produce temporary gains for some women, but had little effect on the 
structures of discrimination more broadly. They allow women access to a world already 
constituted by men and do not challenge gendered structures, such as workplaces and 
politics. Rebecca Cook has urged an approach that focuses on those who are especially 
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vulnerable. She urges attention to disadvantage, that is “a law or policy that maintains or 
aggravates the disadvantage of a persistently disadvantaged group is discriminatory.” 
This perspective “requires [decision-makers] to look at women as they function in the 
real world to determine whether women’s abuse or deprivation of power is due to their 
place in a sexual or gender hierarchy.”268  
Substantive equality requires restructuring social and political life through 
destabilising structural barriers to equality. As Sandra Fredman has argued: 
 
Transformation requires a redistribution of power and resources and a change in 
the institutional structures which perpetuate women’s oppression... . It aims to 
facilitate the full expression of women’s capabilities and choices, and the full 
participation of women in society.269 
 
Article 5 of the Women’s Convention provides a useful tool to achieve this. It calls on 
States parties to modify “social and cultural patterns of conduct.” CEDAW has 
elaborated this, stating that “[t]he lives of women and men must be considered in a 
contextual way, and measures adopted towards a real transformation of opportunities, 
institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically determined 
male paradigms of power and life patterns.”270 Gender stereotypes are perpetuated 
through a variety of means and institutions including laws and legal systems and by 
State actors in all branches and levels of government as well as by private actors. The 
Committee has applied this reasoning to, for example, attitudes towards women that 
condone domestic violence,271 to judicial processes where “stereotyping affects 
women’s right to a fair and just trial”,272 and to the workplace.273 UN Women could forge 
a closer working relationship with CEDAW to assist in the elaboration of a concept of 
substantive equality. This would both strengthen the legal framework for the work of UN 
Women and enhance the visibility and status of CEDAW. 
 Anne Marie Goetz draws attention to the significance of accountability for the 
achievement of substantive equality for women in both public and private spheres of 
activity. She argues that those holding power, whether it be in government, the market 
or the family, should be required to explain and justify their actions in terms of human 
rights and be subject to penalties if they act abusively.274 
 Other strategies of substantive equality include the development of concepts that 
capture the limits of women’s lives and create political momentum for change.275 
International law has remained tethered to an understanding of women’s equality based 
on non-discrimination with a male comparator. One example of this is the account of 
violence against women as a form of discrimination. While it was an important first step 
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to acknowledge violence against women as a matter of international concern,276 an 
analysis based on discrimination limits the inquiry. In practice, violence is less a product 
of discrimination than it is of power and domination; understanding it only in terms of 
discrimination can lead to strained and unconvincing arguments. As Iris Marion Young 
has pointed out, “[w]hile discriminatory policies sometimes cause or reinforce 
oppression, oppression involves many actions, practices, and structures that have little 
to do with preferring or excluding members of groups in the awarding of benefits.”277 
Alternatives to discrimination paradigms include the concept of “undervaluation” 
in the context of pay disparities for women rather than that of “equal pay,” which 
immediately implicates a male comparator,278 and discounts the sexual division of 
labour. Another is the notion of “policy neglect” in the area of resource allocation, which 
draws attention to groups that end up disadvantaged by apparently neutral policies. 
These ideas have resonance in the international arena; for example the concept of 
policy neglect could be used to capture the effect of the policies of international 
monetary institutions, of militarisation, and of globalised trade regimes on women’s lives  
  
CONCLUSION 
 
Although, as Joan Scott has pointed out, the history of feminism is often 
presented as one of “cumulative progress towards an ever-elusive goal,” it is more 
accurately understood as one of contradiction and paradox.279 UN Women illustrates 
these contradictions and paradoxes well. It is a significant development of the structures 
of global governance and provides a focal point for analysis of women’s lives at the 
international level. At the same time, the new “gender architecture” may offer a 
renovated room with no substantive view. The lack of a clear normative vision was to 
some extent the product of concern within the UN Secretariat that any attempt to define 
substantive goals may have resulted in a very restrictive mandate. 
Throughout the history of UN engagement with the situation of women, there has 
been debate about whether it is better to create special institutions dealing with women 
or to address their concerns in bodies with a general mandate. Proponents of the former 
position feared being invisible while proponents of the latter feared marginalisation. The 
creation of UN Women resolves this controversy in favour of specialisation and the price 
of this visibility is not yet clear. 
Martti Koskenniemi has noted that the purpose of specialization – “the creation of 
special regimes of knowledge and expertise” – is to achieve change in the international 
legal arena. He observes that “[i]f such regimes are bold in ambition, and able to rely on 
the support of some powerful sector of the political world, then they may succeed in 
changing the general bias in the law.”280 We have argued that an appropriately bold 
ambition for UN Women is to pay as much attention to the legal framework for women 
as to achieving institutional coherence, opening the possibility of linking normative 
change with mobilisation. We have proposed a revival of the idea of substantive equality 
as a direction for normative development, undermining the male bias of the international 
legal system. This will require constant engagement with groups outside the UN to be 
effective. We acknowledge however that the institutional context of the UN will, in time, 
lead to the simplification, selective incorporation and possibly sloganisation of these 
ideas too and that they will need to be constantly challenged and revised. 
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